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CONGRESSIONAL CRIMINALITY AND BALANCE OF
POWERS: ARE INTERNAL FILTER TEAMS REALLY WHAT
OUR FOREFATHERS ENVISIONED?
Emily E. Eineman*
Mark Twain once quipped: "It could probably be shown by facts
and figures that there is no distinctly American criminal class except
Congress." Will Rogers said, "Congress is the best money can buy."'
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.2
PREFACE: A LATE NIGHT RAID ON CONGRESS
On the night of May 20, 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed
an unprecedented search warrant on Congressman William J. Jefferson's office in
the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, D.C.3 The search, which lasted
all night and well into the next day, was part of a Department of Justice (DOJ)
investigation into allegations that Jefferson accepted bribes from a technology
company and was involved in wire fraud, conspiracy, and the attempted bribery of
African officials.4
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2008; B.S., Florida State University, 2005. I
would like to thank the BORJ Editorial Board and staff for their assistance with this Note
and my mother and father, to whom I truly owe everything.
' L. Peter Schultz, Introduction to SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOvERNMENT
185 (Bradford P. Wilson and Peter W. Schramm, eds., 1994) (citation omitted).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (1961).
3 Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Contends Lawmaker Hid Bribe in Freezer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2006, at Al ("F.B.I. officials said the raid, which began about 7:15 p.m. Saturday and ended
early Sunday afternoon, was the first the agency had ever conducted at a lawmaker's office
on Capitol Hill.").
' Id. at AI, A17. "The search warrant... accused Mr. Jefferson ... of accepting bribes
to help a small technology company win contracts with federal agencies and with businesses
and governments in West Africa. Mr. Jefferson... is one of several members of Congress
who are under scrutiny by the Justice Department on corruption charges." Id. at Al. "[T]he
F.B.I. said its investigation of Mr. Jefferson began in March 2005 and had turned up
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Because the search warrant was to be executed on a congressional office, the
FBI and the DOJ "decided to adopt special procedures in order to minimize the
likelihood that any potentially politically sensitive, non-responsive items in the
Office [would] be seized and provided to the Prosecution Team."5 These pro-
cedures included the use of a filter team composed of one attorney from the Office
of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, one attorney from the DOJ,
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and a non-case FBI special agent.6
The filter team reviewed seized paper and computer records to determine
whether each document was responsive to a list of items provided in the search
warrant.7 Responsive items next underwent a second level of review, during which
the filter team determined whether the records fell under the Speech or Debate
Clause privilege8 of the U.S. Constitution.' The filter team turned over documents
they deemed to be non-privileged to the prosecution team immediately, with no
judicial review or verification.° Jefferson was not afforded an opportunity to assert
his privilege or to challenge the government's determinations of whether the privi-
lege applied to seized material." The filter team then created a log of potentially
privileged records identified by date, recipient, sender, and subject matter, which
was at some point provided to Jefferson's counsel.12 The filter team requested that
the district court further review potentially privileged records to make a final deter-
mination of whether, in fact, the privilege applied. 13
The FBI's raid on Jefferson's Capitol Hill office sparked a storm of political
controversy in the media and among congressional leaders. The raid was called
"surprising,""' an exercise of "broad executive authority,"' 5 and "a dangerous
evidence of various crimes by the lawmaker, including bribery, wire fraud, conspiracy and
attempted bribery of officials of foreign governments in Nigeria and Ghana." Id. at A17.
' Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant at 91 136-55, In re Search of Rayburn
House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-23 1-M-01 (D.D.C. 2006),
available at http://www.citizensforethics.org/filelibrary/ApplicationforSearchWarrant.pdf
[hereinafter Search Warrant].
6 Id. at 139.
' Id. at 138, 151. The schedule of responsive items is entirely redacted from the publicly
available version of the Search Warrant. See id. at Schedule B.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
9 Search Warrant, supra note 5, at in 140-41, 150-51.
l0 Id. at U 141-42, 151, 152 n.40.
" Memorandum in Support of Motion for Return of Property at 15, In re Search of
Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-231 -M-01 (D.D.C.
2006) [hereinafter Motion Memorandum for Return of Property].
12 Id. at 6; Search Warrant, supra note 5, at H1 142, 152.
" Search Warrant, supra note 5, at 911 143, 154.
14 Carl Hulse, F.B.L Raid Divides G.O.P. Lawmakers and White House, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 24, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Hulse, F.B.L Raid].
15 Id.
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precedent."' 6 Then-Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert condemned the search in
a rare joint statement with then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi: "The Justice
Department was wrong to seize records from Congressman Jefferson's office in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the speech or
debate clause of the Constitution, and the practice of the last 219 years."'
17
Amidst these "cries of constitutional foul,"'" Jefferson and his attorney, Robert
Trout, filed a Motion for Return of Property with the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.' 9 A memorandum filed in support of the motion stated that
"[tihe delicate balance of our democratic system was disrupted when the court
authorized the executive branch to search the Member's office and peruse and remove
Speech or Debate material."2 In a memorandum opinion, Chief Judge Thomas
Hogan2 denied Jefferson's motion and upheld the constitutionality of the search,
ruling that the FBI's raid did not violate the separation of powers principle or the
Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause.22 On February 28, 2007, Jefferson asked
a federal appeals court to force the DOJ to return all seized documents.23 On June 4,
2007, the grand jury returned a sixteen count, ninety-four page indictment24 against
Jefferson in the Eastern District of Virginia.25 Jefferson's appeal of Hogan's ruling
was decided by the D.C. Circuit on August 3, 2007.26 The court ordered the return
16 Id. at A22 ("But lawmakers of both parties said they had no interest in protecting
criminal activities or Mr. Jefferson. Their fear, they said, is that the search set a dangerous
precedent that could be used by future administrations to intimidate or harass a supposedly
coequal branch of the government.").
17 Carl Hulse, House Leaders Demand Return of Seized Files, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006,
at Al.
18 Hulse, F.B.L Raid, supra note 14, at Al.
'9 Motion for Return of Property and Emergency Motion for Interim Relief at 1, 3, In re
Search of Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515,434 F. Supp. 2d
3 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 06-231-M-01).
20 Motion Memorandum for Return of Property, supra note 11, at 13.
21 Interestingly, Hogan is the same judge who signed the search warrant. See Search
Warrant, supra note 5. It is unlikely that Hogan would have reached any other result than the
one he did in In re Search as he had previously approved the special search procedures when
he issued the search warrant, and, had he granted Jefferson's Motion for Return of Property,
Hogan would have effectively overruled himself. See In re Search of Rayburn House Office
Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006).
22 In re Search, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05.
23 Jefferson Attorneys Callfor Return ofRaided Documents, CongressDaily, Mar. 1, 2007.
24 Louisiana Congressman Pleads Not Guilty in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,2007,
at A10 [hereinafter Congressman Pleads].
5 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Congressman William Jefferson Indicted on Bribery,
Racketeering, Money Laundering, Obstruction of Justice, and Related Charges (June 4, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2007/June/07_crm_402.html.
26 United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-
3105, 2007 WL 2275237 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2007).
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of all privileged documents seized in the FBI raid.27 As of this writing, Jefferson
has pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.28
INTRODUCrION
This Note will examine the use of internal filter teams29 during criminal investi-
gations of members of Congress.3" It is the position of this Note that such teams,
made up solely of executive branch officials, violate the Constitution's Speech or
Debate Clause privilege and the principle of separation of powers, which is central
to American government.3 '
This Note argues that the dual theories of separation of powers and checks and
balances demand a greater role for judges during investigations of members of
Congress, and that this role includes neutral intervention between the executive and
the legislature through the creation of independent filter teams. The executive's
zealous public integrity investigations "have created an unprecedented potential for
abuses that not only endanger the constitutional rights of private citizens, but may
threaten the balance of power between the executive and Congress."32 Some scholars
warn that "members of Congress are uniquely vulnerable to abusive exercises of
prosecutorial discretion. 33 In light of the apparent recent rise in congressional
corruption scandals, 34 it is increasingly important to develop search procedures that
27 Id. at *10.
28 Congressman Pleads, supra note 24, at A10.
29 Filter teams are also commonly known as "taint teams" or "privilege teams." See Heidi
Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin ArmorforAttorney-Client Privilege, 1 CARDOzo
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHIcs J. 15, 21 (2003).
30 The author makes no claim as to whether any privileged materials have been wrongly
used thus far in the Jefferson case, nor whether Jefferson is innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. This Note will address only the constitutionality of the procedures used during
the search of the Rayburn House Office Building on May 20-21, 2006.
"' Filter teams have been questioned--and in some instances, rejected-in other contexts,
especially that of attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d
511, 523 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding the use of a government taint team "inappropriate" and "a
serious risk to holders of privilege"); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 n.2
(D. Vt. 1998) ("It may be preferable for the screening of potentially privileged records to be
left not to a prosecutor behind a 'Chinese Wall,' but to [the judiciary]."); Boghosian, supra
note 29, at 21 (discussing danger that "the Department of Justice... team member's motives
and objectives will be in accordance with those of the prosecution").
32 Anita Bernstein, Note, Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the
Arrest Clause, 94 YALE L.J. 647, 647 (1985).
3' Brian A. Cromer, Comment, Prosecutorial Indiscretion and the United States
Congress: Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel, 77 KY. L.J. 923,925 (1989).
' See, e.g., Editorial, Locking up the Ghost of Congress Past, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2007,
at A14 (discussing a proposed independent integrity office to investigate congressional ethics
violations); Editorial, The Odor from Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A22
(reviewing several recent congressional scandals).
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will allow criminal investigations to go forward while guarding the speech or debate
privilege and the separation of powers. Therefore, in order to comply with the
Supreme Court's direction that the speech or debate privilege be applied broadly,35
this Note proposes judicial creation of independent filter teams for future
interbranch investigations.
These filter teams would be wholly removed from the executive branch, temporary,
and answerable to thejudiciary. The proposed filter teams would exist only to review
potentially privileged material and make determinations as to whether the privilege
applies. The utilization of such teams more adequately protects the Speech or Debate
Clause privilege and the separation of powers, and in doing so raises the legitimacy
of future criminal investigations into Congress.
This Note will conclude that such interbranch appointments are constitutional.
The members of the filter teams would likely be classified as agents or employees
and could therefore be appointed at the discretion of a judge with no prior author-
ization from Congress. If, however, the members of the filter teams were determined
to be officers of the United States, the appointments would still be constitutional
under the Supreme Court's existing Appointments Clause analysis because the
members would be classified as inferior officers. Furthermore, there would be no
incongruity in judicially created filter teams because federal judges are, in fact,
uniquely well-positioned for this task. Such appointments would therefore not offend
the separation of powers principle or the Constitution.
In Part I, this Note will discuss the purpose and application of the Speech or
Debate Clause privilege and its place in the American structure of separated powers.
Then, in Part II, the analysis will shift to the judiciary's unique checking and balancing
role, particularly in the context of applying the Speech or Debate Clause privilege
through analogy to the executive privilege. Finally, in Part I, this Note will propose
that the appointment of external filter teams is constitutional through analogy to
independent counsel.
I. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE PRIVILEGE
Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides:
The Senators and Representatives... shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place. 6
31 See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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The Speech or Debate Clause was included in the Constitution to protect legislators
from being targeted for criminal prosecution as political retaliation.37 Although the
privilege belongs to each individual member of Congress,38 the Framers added this
protection not to shield members from criminal liability,39 but rather to protect the
coequal status and independence of the legislature in the American system of
separated powers.' In United States v. Brewster, the Court held that the Clause must
be applied "in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature without
altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government."'" It is
this careful balance and a desire to protect the independence of the legislature that
motivated the Framers to include the Speech or Debate Clause in the Constitution,42
and the privilege remains a central part of the American ideal of separation of powers.43
As the Court described in Brewster, "the privilege is broad enough to insure the
historic independence of the Legislative Branch, essential to our separation of powers,
but narrow enough to guard against the excesses of those who would corrupt the
process by corrupting its Members."' It is accepted universally that the Speech or
Debate Clause does not immunize members of Congress from criminal liability for
" United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966) ("There is little doubt that the
instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators.., is the predominate
thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause.").
38 United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 493 (1979) ("[T]he privilege secured... is
not so much the privilege of the house as an organized body, as of each individual member
composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the house.")
(quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808)).
31 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203 (1880) ("These privileges are thus
secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for their own
benefit... ." (quoting Coffin, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) at 27)).
o See Louis Fisher, The Allocation of Powers: The Framers' Intent, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN THE AMERICAN POLITcAL SYSTEM 19, 22 (Barbara B. Knight ed., 1989) ("The
courts have consistently held that the immunities offered by this Clause exist not simply for
the personal or private benefit of members 'but to protect the integrity of the legislative
process by insuring the independence of individual legislators."') (quoting United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972)).
41 408 U.S. at 508.
42 See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) ("The purpose of
the Clause is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may
be performed independently.").
41 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 491 (stating that the clause works "to preserve the constitutional
structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of government"); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) ("In the American governmental structure the clause
serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately estab-
lished by the Founders."); Bernstein, supra note 32, at 662 ("By expressing the separateness
of the legislature with respect to freedom from arrest and freedom of debate, the privileges
clause comes closer than any other textual provision to a constitutional affirmation of insti-
tutional integrity as mandated by separation of powers.").
44 408 U.S. at 525.
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bribery and other acts of corruption, as the Court stressed in Gravel v. United States
when it stated, "Article I, § 6, cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to
confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress from liability or process in
criminal cases."45
What is not so clear, however, are the precise protections the Clause affords to
members of Congress who are under criminal investigation. ' The Clause is commonly
recognized as providing two separate privileges: one of "free[dom] from arrest while
attending or traveling to or from a session" and one of protection "from questioning
in any other place for any speech or debate in either House."'47 The testimonial privilege
"operates to protect those to whom it applies from being compelled to give testi-
mony as to privileged matters, and from being compelled to produce privileged
documents."4 To qualify for the privilege, documents and other materials must be
part of a legitimate legislative act, defined as "an act generally done in Congress in
relation to the business before it."49 However, not everything a senator or represent-
ative might do can logically be a privileged act.50 The act or material in question
must be "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes" of Congress
45 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972); see also In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg.
Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515,432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112 (D.D.C. 2006) ("The purpose
of the Speech or Debate Clause is not to promote or maintain secrecy in legislative
activity."); Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and
Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REv. 105, 110 (1995) ("[F]ederal
criminal laws apply to congressmen. This fact exposes them to the full powers of investi-
gation and prosecution of the Department of Justice.... Prosecutions for crimes such as
bribery... have succeeded even though they present tricky problems of avoiding intrusion
on the Speech or Debate privilege of the members." (citations omitted)); Bernstein, supra
note 32, at 662-63 ("Legislative privilege is a force for equality between branches, not
superiority of congressmen over their fellow citizens.").
' See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 45, at 124 (discussing how "the Court accommodates
criminal law to the privilege by defining the elements of a crime to steer clear of any need
for proof of legislative acts"); Michael R. Seghetti, Note, Speech or Debate Immunity:
Preserving Legislative Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 589, 594 (1985) ("While the object of the bribe, the congressman's
action in a session of Congress, falls within the definition of speech or debate, the deal-
making performed outside of Congress is not protected.").
" In re Search, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 109-10.
48 Motion Memorandum for Return of Property, supra note 11, at 9-10.
49 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512.
o See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973) ("Our cases make perfectly apparent,
however, that everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is not a legislative act
within the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause."); see also Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625
("Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate .... As
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended the privilege to matters beyond pure
speech or debate in either House, but 'only when necessary to prevent in direct impairment
of such deliberations."' (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (lst Cir. 1972))).
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that falls within "the legislative sphere."'" "Committee reports, resolutions, and the
act of voting" are within the legislative sphere,52 as is information-gathering. a
The privilege's jurisprudential history, while relatively meager,' indicates that the
Clause was traditionally interpreted broadly in order to afford congressmen the most
protection possible.55 The Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson held that the Clause "ought
not be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered."' In
Gravel the Court stated, "[P]rior cases have plainly not taken a literalistic approach in
applying the privilege. The Clause... speaks only of 'Speech or Debate,' but the
Court's consistent approach has been that to confine the protection... to words spoken
in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view."57 Furthermore, when applicable, the
privilege is "absolute,"" and there is no balancing test used by courts.59
Because neither the FBI nor any other executive branch agency saw fit to raid
a congressional office prior to the Jefferson case, 6° proper search procedures to
protect the legislative privilege and separation of powers have never been
addressed. In his In re Search decision, Chief Judge Hogan held that "[t]he Speech
or Debate Clause is not undermined by the mere incidental review of privileged
legislative material"'61 and that "[tihe Government's incidental and cursory review
of documents covered by the legislative privilege, in order to extract non-privileged
evidence, does not constitute an intrusion on legitimate legislative activity."'62 Hogan
is correct that the Clause appears to contain no express prohibition against executive
branch officials merely viewing privileged material. Notwithstanding this, he failed
to adequately recognize the danger of late-night, unsupervised executive branch
seizures of privileged documents to be "filtered" later.63
"' Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624-25.
52 Id. at 617.
53 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (quoting McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)).
' The Clause was not construed by the Supreme Court until 1881, and since then, it has
been interpreted less than a dozen times. JoHN C. GRABOW, CoNGREssIoNAL INvESTIGATIoNs:
LAW AND PRAcTIcE 196 (1988).
" See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 ("Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or
Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes." (emphasis added)).
56 103 U.S. 168, 203 (1880) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808)).
17 408 U.S. at 617.
58 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509.
'9 Id. at 509-11 n.16.
0 See Shenon, supra note 3, at Al.
61 In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515,
432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 114 (D.D.C. 2006).
62 Id. at 116 n.9.
63 For a description of the potential dangers of executive power in this context, see
Cromer, supra note 33, at 924-25. "[Article II's] broad grant of discretionary authority, the
destructive nature of the power to prosecute, and the inherent constitutional conflict between
the President and Congress." Id.
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The D.C. Court of Appeals, however, correctly held that "a search that allows
agents of the Executive to review privileged materials without the Member's
consent violates the [Speech or Debate] Clause."' The court based this ruling on
the non-disclosure privilege in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams.65
The court further held that there could be no doubt that the legislative privilege was
violated during the FBI raid on Jefferson's Capitol Hill office.66 Unfortunately, the
court did not provide any recommendations on how such searches should be
conducted in the future.
A. Impermissible Interference
This Note asserts that the internal filter team used during the FBI's search of
Jefferson's Capitol Hill office breached the Speech or Debate Clause privilege when
members of the executive branch viewed and removed privileged material. The raid
clearly violated the spirit of the Clause. The Court in Powell v. McCormack held that
"[t]he purpose of the protection afforded legislators is... to insure that legislators
are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks. 67
A more distracting and hindering event can hardly be imagined than having one's
office secretly raided in the middle of the night and assorted documents seized to
be filtered at some other time and in some other location.
The Speech or Debate Clause privilege "serves to insulate members of Congress
from distractions that 'divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative
tasks." 68 The Court in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. held that the Clause's
"touchstone is interference with legislative activities. '69 The unprecedented FBI
raid on Jefferson's office undoubtedly caused him and other members of Congress
immeasurable time, energy, attention, and resources. The D.C. Circuit in Rayburn
described the likely effects: "This compelled disclosure clearly tends to disrupt the
legislative process: exchanges [among members and their staffs] on legislative
matters may legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility
of compelled disclosure may therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to
legislative activity."70
' United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-
3105, 2007 WL 2275237, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2007).
65 Id. at *7 (citing 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
6 Id. at *8. "The search of Congressman Jefferson's office must have resulted in the
disclosure of legislative materials to agents of the Executive. Indeed, the application
accompanying the warrant contemplated it." Id. at *6.
67 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
6' Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.D.C. 1995)
(quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975)).
69 id.
70 Rayburn, 2007 WL 2275237, at *6.
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If searches like this one are upheld as legitimate exercises of executive power
and continue to be utilized as investigative tools, it is entirely plausible to expect
senators and representatives to be significantly distracted, and their time, energy,
and attention diverted from the performance of their daily legislative duties by the
looming specter of executive branch officials raiding their own offices at any moment.
The Founders undoubtedly contemplated this kind of hindrance of the legislative
process as they drafted the Speech or Debate Clause.
B. "Questioning in Any Other Place"
In addition to brazenly defying the spirit of the Clause, the raid also violated its
letter, as the DOJ's actions constituted impermissible "question[ing] in any other
[p]lace."7 This phrase should be broken down into two parts for analysis. First, the
Jefferson raid constitutes questioning. The term "questioned" in the Clause is not
read literally to mean only the act of testifying.72 Rather, the testimonial privilege
also protects members of Congress from being compelled to produce privileged
documents73 and, it appears, even more. In United States v. Helstoski, the Court held
that "[rievealing information as to a legislative act.., to ajury would subject a Member
to being 'questioned' in a place other than the House or Senate, thereby violating the
explicit prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause."'74 If merely telling a jury about
legislative acts amounts to a violation, it can hardly be maintained that the Jefferson
raid should be called anything else. Just as submitting privileged information to a
neutral, objective jury violates the Clause, so too must a detailed review of privi-
leged paper documents and electronic files by executive branch officials hidden away
from the legislature.
The Framers intended senators and representatives to be accountable to the people
but not to a potentially hostile executive.75 In order to effectuate this accountability,
some questioning must be permissible under the Clause. The pertinent inquiry, then,
is not whether the legislators are being questioned but rather by whom they are
being questioned. Everything the Framers sought to prevent when they drafted the
Speech or Debate Clause, such as intimidation and retaliatory prosecutions, results
only from executive questioning.76 Surely the Framers envisioned some kind of
questioning from the judicial branch or criminal prosecutions of members of
Congress would be impossible, which quite clearly was not the object of including
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. ("[fIor any Speech or Debate in either House, [senators
and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." (emphasis added)).
72 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
14 442 U.S. 447, 490 (1979).
" See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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the Clause.7 7 It is therefore the position of this Note that the filtering process in criminal
investigations of Congress would not violate the "question[ing] in any other Place"
prohibition7" when done by teams created by the judicial branch rather than by
teams comprised solely of executive branch officials.
The raid also violated the locational term "in any other Place." Jefferson and all
House officials were excluded from being present during the search, 79 thereby construc-
tively converting Jefferson's office into "any other Place" for purposes of the Speech
or Debate Clause privilege. Under the DOJ's search procedures, documents were
removed to be filtered in another location, ° which also clearly constitutes questioning
"in any other Place." Furthermore, the computer files seized were copied and then
searched at the FBI's computer analysis and response team laboratory.8 ' An FBI lab
is undoubtedly "any other Place."
There are no judicial precedents construing the phrase, "in any other Place," nor
any historical records indicating what, precisely, the Framers intended for it to
encompass.82 It is clear, however, that the Clause's drafters sought to protect legis-
lators not from being investigated at all, but rather from the possibility that such
investigations would prevent legislators from carrying out their duties.83 It is likely
that a fie or document Jefferson needed for a House debate or vote could be mislabeled
as non-privileged and removed from his office.' It is also likely that Jefferson would
not even realize this item was missing until he needed it because the raid was
conducted outside of his presence and the presence of his counsel.8 5 This is the kind
of distraction and hindrance that the Framers intended to prevent.8 6 It follows then,
that if the review of the privileged materials was conducted inside the office and
within the presence of Jefferson, his lawyers, and House officials, the search would
presumably be contained within the legislative branch sufficient to steer clear of the
definition of "any other Place" for Speech or Debate Clause purposes.
" See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
78 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
71 Motion Memorandum for Return of Property, supra note 11, at 1, 7.
o Search Warrant, supra note 5, at %% 139-40.
81 Id. at V1 145-46.
82 The author's research failed to reveal any such records, and a recent Congressional
Research Service Memorandum indicates that their attorneys and specialists were also unable
to locate "court cases or historical evidence that may guide modem interpreters as to the
phrase's meaning." Memorandum from Morton Rosenberg et al., Congressional Research
Serv. on Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by Executive Branch Searches of Legislative
Offices to Congressional Clients 25 n.146 (June 13, 2006), available at http://www
.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/JeffersonGDMemo.pdf.
83 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975); see also Motion
Memorandum for Return of Property, supra note 11, at 8-9.
8 See Motion Memorandum for Return of Property, supra note 11, at 12-13, 15, 16.
8" Id. at 1, 7.
86 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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This Note proposes the creation of external, independent filter teams to conduct
searches of congressional offices when necessary. Independent filter teams would
enable the DOJ to constitutionally investigate members of Congress and preserve
the admissibility of evidence discovered in such investigations. The review done by
these filter teams would not constitute "question[ing] in any other Place," because it
would be performed by people outside of the class that the Framers intended to exclude
from questioning and would be performed within the legislative branch itself.
19. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE
The formation of filter teams wholly removed from both the legislative and
executive branches is a task properly placed with the judiciary under the dual theories
of separation of powers and checks and balances. The Framers of the Constitution
envisioned such confrontations between the branches and carefully created a system
of governance in which each branch acts as a counterweight to the others.8 7 The
Founders "viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against
tyranny,"88 and they believed the idea that "power must check power by the arrangement
of things."'89 The Framers also believed in "giving to those who administer each depart-
ment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroach-
ments of the others,"' and so they created what has been called a "self-executing
safeguard" against such encroachments. 9'
One crucial part of this safeguard is judicial intervention between the executive and
legislature.92 It has been said that "[flor anything of consequence to be accomplished,
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 289-90.
88 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam); see also CHARLES-LOUIS DE
SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) ("All would be lost
if the same man or the same body of principal men, either of nobles, or of the people,
exercised these three powers: that of making laws, that of executing public resolutions, and
that of judging the crimes or disputes of individuals."). For a discussion of Montesquieu's
influence on the Framers, see Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu's Theory of Government
and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 20-36 (1990).
89 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 88, at 155.
90 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 289-90.
9' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122.
92 Though the judiciary is arguably required to step between the executive and the
legislature, it is often reluctant to do so. See T.J. Halstead, The Separation of Powers
Doctrine: An Overview of its Rationale and Application, in THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE: RATIONALE, APPLICATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 1, 36 (Michael C. Packard ed.,
2002) (discussing "U]udicial reticence in ruling on direct conflicts of constitutional authority
between the legislative and executive branches"); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Supreme Court
Enforcement of Separation of Powers: A Balance Sheet, in SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 81, 84 (Barbara B. Knight ed., 1989) ("The bulk of Supreme
Court business-and objections to its decisions-have always concerned federalism and
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the executive and legislative branches must be brought from confrontation into a reason-
able degree of harmony., 93 In United States v. Brewster, the Court stated that "[t]he
check-and-balance mechanism, buttressed by unfettered debate in an open society with
a free press, has not encouraged abuses of power or tolerated them long when they
arose. This may be explained in part because the third branch has intervened with
neutral authority."'94
Monitoring the executive for overstepping its bounds is clearly within the purview
of the judiciary. In fact, the Framers did not heavily limit the executive's power because
they presumed that the judiciary would intervene and "fill[] in [restrictions] over
time."95 It seems, then, that the neutral intervener role is precisely what the Framers
envisioned for the judiciary. 96
A. Judges as Final Interpreters of Legislative Privilege
Criminal investigations into Congress present a situation that allows and, in fact,
demands judicial intervention. The determination of the existence of the Speech or
Debate Clause privilege is a task that can be placed neither with Congress, nor with
the President. It must, then, fall to the judiciary to interpret the bounds of the privilege.
individual rights, not separation of powers.").
" Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787 Perspective on Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION
OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 138 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986)
(quoting James Sundquist, More Confrontation, Stalemate, Deadlock, WASH. POST, June 26,
1983, at D).
94 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972).
9' See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 310 (1989).
The powers of the executive branch are not as carefully constrained for
conflicts of interest in article H as Congress' powers are in article I. To
some degree this fact reflects the framers' belief that the power of the
President was not as great a concern. Thus the executive power is
granted to a President in article H whereas the legislative power is both
granted and limited by article I. The restraints upon the executive
branch were presumably to be filled in over time by Congress through
the enactment of legislation and by the Supreme Court through the
exercise of the power of constitutional interpretation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 994 (2006) ("[The Framers] feared the tyranny of majorities that would seek to oppress
opponents through the use of criminal laws. They therefore established a constitutional
structure that separates power among the branches and gives the judiciary (judges and juries)
a particularly strong role in enforcing that separation."); Cromer, supra note 33, at 949
("'[T]he weakest of the three departments of power' clearly is less prone than the executive
branch to be driven by the desire to disadvantage the legislature." (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 2, at 433-34)).
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The executive cannot properly decide when the privilege applies and when it does
not, because the executive may be the target of the potentially privileged speech.97
Congress, as the body which stands to gain from the Clause's application, cannot
determine the reach of its own privilege.9 The Framers of the Constitution specifically
rejected a proposal to allow members of Congress, acting as one body, to be the
exclusive judge of their own privileges. 9 The Founders preferred, rather, to have the
privilege determined by law; that is to say, the courts." Chief Judge Hogan, in his
In re Search opinion, even went so far as to declare that "[t]he formulation of the
Speech or Debate privilege implies that thejudiciary cannot avoid determining what
are the outer limits of legitimate legislative process.....
1. Executive Privilege Analogy
An analogy to the executive privilege is helpful, as the privilege belonging to
the President is the governmental privilege most closely comparable to that provided
to Congress by the Speech or Debate Clause. 102 In United States v. Nixon, the President
claimed that the separation of powers precluded judicial review of his assertion of
executive privilege.'0 3 The Court began its analysis with the principle of judicial
review and quoted the rule from the seminal case, Marbury v. Madison: "[I]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.""'"
The Court next moved on to state, "Our system of government 'requires that federal
courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the con-
struction given the document by another branch."" 5 Finally, the Court discussed
that its role as "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution" included determining the
relative powers and authority of the other two branches.' 6 The Court held that the
President could not unilaterally assert his privilege free from judicial review.0 7
9' See supra Part L.A (describing the Speech or Debate privilege as a protection against
impermissible executive interference with Congress).
98 See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1880) ("The house of represent-
atives is not the final judge of its own power and privileges ...." (quoting Burnham v.
Morrissey, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 226, 238 (1859))).
9 In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515,
432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 114 (D.D.C. 2006).
"" "In opposition to the proposal, Madison explained that it would be preferable to make
provision for ascertaining by law the extent of privileges previously [and] duly established
rather than to give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges." Id.
'0' Id. at 115 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis added)).
'02 This analogy was also utilized by Judge Hogan in In re Search, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
103 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
'4 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
'05 Id. at 704 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)).
"06 Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
'07 Id. at 706.
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These principles are easily applicable in the context of congressional office
searches. A senator or representative cannot assert his Speech or Debate Clause
privilege without the approval of a court.10 8 Nor can the executive decide what is
privileged and what is not.109 Particularly relevant here, the D.C. Circuit stated in
Rayburn that "it is, of course, the judiciary, not the executive or legislature, that
delineates the scope of the privilege."' 0 Thus, in the Jefferson case, only Chief Judge
Hogan could determine when to apply the privilege, and he could have done so by
forming a filter team to act as his agent in identifying, reviewing, and classifying
Jefferson's documents and files.
2. Political Question Analysis
In order for ajudicial review and determination of privilege to be constitutional
it must not present a political question. " Political questions arise in cases that require
non-legal knowledge or techniques not suitable for a court, and they render some
matters non-justiciable." 2 The Supreme Court already upheld ajudicial determination
of privilege against claims that it would constitute a political question." 3
Several formulations present a political question inextricably linked to the case. 4
The first condition that will create a political question is "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.!" 5 In the
context of the Speech or Debate Clause privilege, there is no text in the Constitution
that allocates the power to determine the Clause's applicability to another branch
of government.
Second, an issue will be deemed a political question when there is "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."' 6 This condition
is also not present in the scenario at hand, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Speech or Debate Clause several times and provided judicial precedents to follow
when construing the privilege.17
Third, "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" creates a political question."' The creation of
los See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
"o9 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
"1 United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-
3105, 2007 WL 2275237, at *12 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2007).
"' See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.
112 id.
"' See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974).
"14 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
115 id.
116 id.
"' See supra Part I (discussing Johnson, Helstoski, Kilbourn, Eastland, etc.).
"8 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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filter teams, and the subsequent review of items by that team would not require a judge
to make any policy determinations of a "nonjudicial" nature-it would only require an
application of the Constitution, which is clearly within the purview of the judiciary."9
Fourth is the "impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government."' 2 In the
context of the legislative privilege, there would be no disrespect to the other branches
because the courts alone make the final determinations of the privilege's protections.'
The fifth factor is that of "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made."' 22 This condition would likely not be present in any
judicial creation of filter teams or determination of privilege because the judiciary
does not make political decisions and is not bound by those of the other branches. 123
There could be no controlling political decision in the context of the legislative
privilege, as determinations made by any other branch would be unconstitutional.
Finally, a matter becomes a political question when there is "potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." ' This issue was addressed definitively in the context of the Speech or
Debate Clause by the Court in Powell v. McCormack when it stated, "[A] judicial
resolution of petitioners' claim [for a determination that the House did not have the
power to exclude him from Congress] will not result in 'multifarious pronounce-
ments ....' [I]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution."'125 It therefore seems quite clear that judicial creation of filter
teams, and the subsequent filtering by those teams acting as agents of thejudge who
appointed them, would not create a political question.
The kind of judicial branch filtering process that would be utilized if courts
followed this Note's proposal was ruled constitutional. 26 Chief Judge Hogan even
held constitutional "a document-by-document review by thejudiciary" to determine
whether the Speech or Debate Clause applies. 27
"9 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the jurisdiction of the judiciary).
120 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
121 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
122 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
124 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
125 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
126 See Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 98 F.R.D. 42,45 & n.2 (D. Md. 1983) (requiring that
a detailed index of potentially privileged documents be prepared for judicial review and
suggested that an in camera review of contested documents may be necessary); In re Possible
Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 371, 491 F. Supp. 211, 214 (D.D.C. 1980) (ordering that
potentially privileged subpoenaed documents be examined in camera).
127 In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515,
432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 115 (D.D.C. 2006).
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B. The Jefferson Raid Violated Separation of Powers
As it is clear that the determination of legislative privilege is a task vested
exclusively in the judiciary, it follows that the executive branch violated the sepa-
ration of powers when it utilized an internal filter team during the Jefferson raid.
There are two approaches for analyzing possible separation of powers violations,
both of which lead to the same conclusion: the use of internal filter teams by the
DOJ to determine legislative privilege during investigations into Congress violates
the separation of powers.
First is the formalist approach, which the Court articulated in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.12 The Court held that presidential authority to issue executive
orders "must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."'
129
Formalism stands for the proposition that "the powers of each branch are exclusive
to it unless the Constitution specifically says otherwise." 3' Applied in the instant
case, the formalist approach would find the Jefferson raid violative of the separation
of powers. There is no congressional or constitutional authorization for the executive
branch's agents to decide when the Speech or Debate Clause applies and when it
does not. Therefore, absent a textual or legislative delegation of the power to determine
the application of the legislative privilege, such an attempt must be struck down.
The competing theory, functionalism, advocates that a pragmatic, flexible
approach is best for the separation of powers.' 3' "[A]ll functionalists believe that
the primary objective of judicial review ... is to insure that each branch retains
'enough' governmental power to permit it to operate as an effective check on the
other branches of government."'132 Under this theory, an act violates the separation
of powers if it is a "core function" of another branch or if the appropriate branch
does not maintain enough control over the function.'33 This entails a determination
of whether the act in question would constitute a usurpation or aggrandizement of
power by one branch at the expense of another."3
The executive's use of internal filter teams violates the separation of powers
doctrine under the functionalist approach as it undoubtedly disrupts the pertinent
control relationship. The power to determine privileges rests solely with the judiciary
as a central element of the American system of checks and balances.'35 If the
executive branch exercises this power instead and determines which documents are
128 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
129 Id. at 585.
130 Katy J. Harriger, The Separation of Powers in the Modem Context, in SEPARATION OF
POwERs: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 15, 17 (Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003).
131 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SuP. CT. REV. 225, 232 (1992).
132 Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 232-33.
134 id.
131 See supra Part II.A. 1.
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privileged and which are not, the judicial branch will be unable to maintain control
of its function as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."' 3 6 Determinations
of privilege amount to an "absolute" function-there can be only one final decision
determining whether to invoke a privilege, and this decision can be made by only
one actor.'37 It is not desirable, or even possible, for this function to be shared between
multiple branches.
Any attempt by the executive to exercise this function amounts to usurpation
of the judicial branch's power and, if allowed, would result in an aggrandizement
of the executive's power. Having the power to declare materials privileged or
unprivileged would significantly increase the executive's power over Congress. If
allowed to make determinations of privilege without judicial review, the executive
could effectively nullify the Speech or Debate Clause and use any documents and
files as evidence against a legislator, regardless of privilege. The Framers specifically
tried to prevent this kind of executive abuse by including the Speech or Debate
Clause in the Constitution. 3 '
Im. "APPOINTING" INDEPENDENT FILTER TEAMS
The judiciary can fulfill its checking and balancing role and its duty as final
determiner of the legislative privilege139 by appointing non-executive branch lawyers
and agents to form temporary, independent filter teams during investigations of
members of Congress. This task is consistent with the judiciary's traditional role
in criminal investigations."4 A judge is, as Chief Judge Hogan put it, "not a mere
rubber stamp in the warrant process, but rather an independent and neutral official
sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution.. 41 Judges have long had authority to
appoint special masters to oversee complex civil discovery or to administer trusts,
such as the 9/11 Fund.4 2 A special master, however, would be insufficient to protect
the Speech or Debate Clause privilege. The privilege is simply too fundamental in
our system of laws to be guarded adequately by one person. If even just for appear-
ance's sake, the privilege must be protected by an entire team of judicially-appointed,
independent filterers.
136 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
"3 See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974) (discussing
determinations of privilege and sharing of power between branches).
138 See supra Part I (asserting that the Speech or Debate Clause was created to insulate the
legislative branch from hostile executive oversight).
139 See supra Part II.A.1.
'40 See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Wash., D.C.
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2006).
141 Id.
142 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1) ("Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court may appoint
a master ... ").
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The Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that the President shall
appoint principal officers such as ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, "but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
43
The Clause, however, does not specify the proper method of appointment for
positions not falling into the "officer" class. 44 It appears, then, that a judge may create
the proposed independent filter teams with no congressional authorization so long
as the members are classified not as "officers," but rather as "employees" or "agents."
The vast majority of people working for the government fall into this class,1 45 and
as will be shown, members of a filter team certainly would as well.
The Court has repeatedly used a stringent standard in classifying appointees as
officers. The Court in United States v. Hartwell held that "[a]n office is a public
station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of government. The term em-
braces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties."'4 6 This standard was
further articulated in United States v. Germaine, in which the Court held that a civil
surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions to periodically examine pensioners
was "but an agent of the commissioner," rather than an officer of the United States,
because "the [surgeon's] duties are not continuing and permanent, and they are
occasional and intermittent." '47 The members of the independent filter teams would
possess this temporary quality. They would be appointed only when there is a risk
of executive officials encountering privileged material during an investigation and
would be disbanded immediately after the filtering process is complete. This temp-
orary, intermittent existence strongly supports the conclusion that filter teams are
"agents" or "employees" of the government rather than "officers."
Furthermore, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that "any appointee exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the
United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the
Appointments Clause] ."148 The proposed independent filter teams would not exercise
any authority other than that needed to examine material and segregate anything
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause privilege. Their work would be super-
vised and subject to review and final determination by ajudge. They would therefore
not possess the "significant authority" described in Buckley1 49 and would clearly not
be officers.
143 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'44 See id.
145 In United States v. Germaine, the Court stated that "nine-tenths of the persons render-
ing service to the government" are "undoubtedly" agents or employees rather than officers.
99 U.S. 508, 509 (1878).
146 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).
147 99 U.S. at 512.
148 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
149 Id.
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Should the members of these ad hoc, independent filter teams be classified as
officers, however, they can be constitutionally appointed by a court as long as they
are considered inferior and not principal.150 Acting pursuant to the Appointments
Clause, Congress could pass a law conferring authority upon the federal courts to
create the independent filter teams when needed.15 1 Motivated by a desire to protect
its legislative privilege and independence from the executive branch, Congress would
likely pass such a law with ease.
The Court has consistently classified positions with far more authority and
responsibility than the members of a filter team as inferior. In United States v. Eaton,
the Court upheld the appointment of vice-consuls during temporary absences of
consuls, because such a vice-consul was "charged with the performance of the duty
of the superior for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions" and
was therefore a "subordinate officer."'' 52 In Ex Parte Siebold and Ex Parte Hennen,
the Court found that federal election supervisors 53 and district court clerks,
154
respectively, were inferior officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Rice v.
Ames held that extradition commissioners could be appointed by federal courts
because such commissioners are not "judges in the constitutional sense."'' 55 In Go-Ban
Importing Co. v. United States, the Court further held that U.S. commissioners with
the power to arrest, to issue warrants, and to institute prosecutions were inferior
officers.'56 These decisions by the Court indicate its resistence to classifying tem-
porary appointees as principal officers, thereby revealing a tendency to group nearly
all such appointees with more responsibility than the filter teams as inferior.
A. The Independent Counsel Analogy
The independent counsel is the most well-known officer that the Court has
declared inferior. The position, then called the "special prosecutor," was created in
1978 by the Ethics in Government Act. 5 7 The Ethics in Government Act was
amended in 1983, 58 and the independent counsel provision was reauthorized in
s0 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132).
151 See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880) ("But as the Constitution stands,
the selection of the appointing power, as between the functionaries named, is a matter resting
in the discretion of Congress.").
152 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898).
151 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
154 Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 228-29 (1839).
155 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901).
156 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 & n.2 (1931).
157 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982); CHARLES A. JOHNSON & DANETrE BRiCKMAN,
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: THE LAW AND THE INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2001).
158 Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039
(1983). The term "special prosecutor" was replaced with "independent counsel" in this
amendment. Id. § 2(b)(1).
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1987"59 and 1994,160 but the provision lapsed in 1999.161 The independent counsel
was appointed by a new three-judge panel, the "Special Division," 162 which was
created by the Ethics in Government Act "for the purpose of appointing independent
counsels."163 During investigations of executive branch officials, the Attorney General
would petition the Special Division to appoint the independent counsel, who would
then investigate and prosecute the case, if necessary.' 64 The independent counsel,
after appointment, could only be removed for good cause by the Attorney General. 
65
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court addressed the question of whether the independent
counsel was an inferior officer and, in making this determination, considered four
factors: removal, duties,jurisdiction, and tenure.166 Although the Court stated, "[w]e
need not attempt here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types
of officers, because in our view [the independent counsel] clearly falls on the 'inferior
officer' side of that line,"'167 Morrison's four-part test has been almost uniformly
accepted as the definitive test since its articulation in 1988.168 An analogy to the
independent counsel is particularly applicable in an analysis of independent filter
teams, as both perform limited functions associated with prosecutions. 169 To
demonstrate the constitutionality of independent filter team appointments, this Note
will now apply the Morrison independent counsel test.
1. Removal
The Morrison test first looks to the means by which the appointed officials may
be removed from office. In Morrison, the Court stated that the independent counsel
was "subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official," namely the Attorney
General, 7 ' and found that this fact "indicates that she is to some degree 'inferior'
in rank and authority."' 171 The members of the proposed filter teams certainly share
this same inferiority of rank and authority because they would be removable by the
"' Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293.
160 Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1994), replaced by 28 C.F.R. §§
600.1-600.10 (2006) (effective July 1, 1999)).
161 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2000); JOHNSON & BRICKMAN, supra note 157, at 1.
162 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661 & n.3 (1988).
163 28 U.S.C. § 49 (2000).
164 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661-63.
165 Id. at 664.
166 Id. at 671-72.
167 Id. at 671.
168 But cf infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing the court's departure
from the Morrison test in Edmond v. United States).
169 See infra Part III.A.2.
170 487 U.S. at 671.
171 Id.
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judge who appointed them. Independent filter teams would therefore meet Morrison's
removal requirement.
2. Duties
The next factor to be considered in assessing the principal or inferior status of
appointed officers is the extent, and perhaps even more importantly, the limitations,
of the duties those officers are empowered to perform.'72 The independent counsel
possessed ten specific powers:
(1) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other
investigations;
(2) participating in court proceedings and engaging in any
litigation, including civil and criminal matters, that such inde-
pendent counsel considers necessary;
(3) appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in
which such independent counsel participates in an official capacity;
(4) reviewing all documentary evidence available from any source;
(5) determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial
privilege;
(6) receiving appropriate national security clearances and, if
necessary, contesting in court (including, where appropriate,
participating in in camera proceedings) any claim of privilege or
attempt to withhold evidence on grounds of national security;
(7) making applications to any Federal court for a grant of
immunity to any witness, consistent with applicable statutory
requirements, or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders,
and... exercising the authority vested in a United States attorney
or the Attorney General;
(8) inspecting, obtaining, or using the original or a copy of any tax
return, in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations,
and... exercising the powers vested in a United States attorney or
the Attorney General;
(9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing
informations, and handling all aspects of any case, in the name
of the United States; and
(10) consulting with the United States attorney for the district in
which any violation of law with respect to which the independ-
ent counsel is appointed was alleged to have occurred. 17 3
172 id.
17' 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1994), replaced by 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.6-600.10 (2006).
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The Court in Morrison, however, found the independent counsel had "only certain,
limited duties"'174 and referred to her role as "restricted" in that she was only authorized
to investigate, and if necessary, to prosecute certain federal crimes in accordance
with the executive branch's policies.'7 5
The duties of the proposed independent filter teams would be considerably more
restricted than those of the independent counsel and would easily meet this factor
of the Morrison test for inferiority. The independent filter teams would be empowered
only to collect and review documents and other materials to determine whether the
Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies. If necessary, a judge would make the
final determination of whether material was protected by the privilege. If the extensive
prosecutorial and discretionary duties of the independent counsel are of an inferior
nature, so too must be the meager duties of the proposed independent filter teams.
3. Jurisdiction
The third factor examined under the Morrison framework is the jurisdiction that
appointed officers possess. 76 The Court found the independent counsel's jurisdiction
of a limited scope because she could only investigate certain federal officials suspected
of specified crimes and because her jurisdiction was only granted pursuant to a
request by the Attorney General. '77 In fact, the officials covered by the independent
counsel law included some of the most powerful government positions, such as the
President, Vice President, and Cabinet officials including the Attorney General, senior
White House staff, the Solicitor General, as well as the Directors of the FBI and
Central Intelligence. 7 s
Moreover, the independent counsel's jurisdiction included the authority to
investigate and prosecute the matter she was appointed to handle as well as most other
federal crimes arising from that matter. 79 Yet, the Court in Morrison found the
independent counsel's jurisdiction sufficiently limited to render her post "inferior."180
The "jurisdiction" of the proposed independent filter teams would undoubtedly
be deemed satisfactorily limited as well, considering that the teams would participate
only in rare investigations and searches involving a recognized risk of violating the
Speech or Debate Clause privilege. The Court in United States v. Germaine appeared
174 487 U.S. at 671.
171 Id. at 671-72.
176 Id. at 672.
177 Id.
178 28 U.S.C. § 591 (2000).
1'9 Id. § 593. The independent counsel was granted jurisdiction over ancillary federal
crimes (other than Class B or C misdemeanors or infractions) "including perjury, obstruction
ofjustice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." Id.
180 487 U.S. at 672.
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to be influenced by the fact that the surgeon in that case was "only to act when
called on by the Commissioner of Pensions in some special case."'81 The proposed
judicially appointed independent filter teams would only have the ability to act when
called upon by the executive branch and would therefore always have ajurisdiction
limited to the matter they were called to handle.
4. Tenure
The final factor in the Morrison analysis is tenure.'82 In Morrison, the Court found
that "the office of independent counsel is 'temporary' in the sense that an independent
counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task is
over the office is terminated."'' 83 The proposed internal filter teams would work in
the same temporary way. They would be formed only in the case of a criminal
investigation into congressional activities that poses a risk of investigators encoun-
tering privileged materials, and disbanded when the investigation concludes, thus
satisfactorily limiting the teams' tenure. The independent filter teams would there-
fore be limited sufficiently under all four Morrison factors and would certainly be
classified as inferior officers.
The Court departed from the Morrison test in Edmond v. United States. 84
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held simply, "Whether one is an 'inferior' officer
depends on whether he has a superior."' 85 Justice Scalia elaborated on the Court's
new standard by stating, "[W]e think it evident that 'inferior officers' are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate."'86 The proposed
independent filter teams undoubtedly also meet this standard, as they would be
directed and supervised by a district court judge who was nominated by the President
and approved by the Senate. 187
B. Congruence of Duties
The next step in the Court's Appointments Clause analysis is to determine whether
there is "some 'incongruity' between the functions normally performed by the courts
18' 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878).
182 487 U.S. at 672.
183 id.
'84 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). Justice Scalia stated, "Morrison did
not purport to set forth a definitive test for whether an office is 'inferior' under the Appoint-
ments Clause." Id. at 661.
185 Id. at 662.
186 Id. at 663.
187 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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and the performance of their duty to appoint."'88 In Ex Parte Siebold, the Court stated,
"It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that
department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive
department to which the duties of such officers appertain." '89 It is, as previously
explicated, the task of thej udiciary to protect the Speech or Debate Clause privilege
of the legislature.' 90 As the Court in United States v. Nixon held, "it is the province and
duty of this Court 'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege."'' The
duties of an independent filter team, then, certainly appertain to the judicial branch.
The filter team would be responsible only for reviewing material and determining
whether the privilege applies, which is clearly a judicial task. The team would not
perform any executive tasks.
In Morrison, the Court stated, "We thus disagree with the.., conclusion that there
is an inherent incongruity about a court having the power to appoint prosecutorial
officers."'9 The Court went on to describe the judicial branch as "especially well
qualified"'193 and as "the most logical place to put" such appointing authority.'9 4 Not
only did the Court in Morrison think it appropriate to allow judges to appoint the
independent counsel,' 95 other courts also upheld the appointments of private attorneys
to prosecute judicial contempt cases 9 6 and of interim U.S. Attorneys. 97
If the Court is willing for Congress to grant judges the power to appoint
prosecutors and private lawyers to actually try entire cases, why not allow judges
to appoint the substantially more inferior members of a filter team who would simply
assist in the investigation process? Judges are well-positioned to select attorneys
and agents to compose independent filter teams, and there is arguably no more
appropriate place in which to vest this proposed appointment authority.'9 8 The
Framers of the Constitution did not envision a "hermetic sealing off' of the branches
from each other or a "total separation of each of [the] three essential branches of
188 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676 (1988) ("[Tlhe duty to appoint inferior officers, when
required thereto by law, is a constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case there
is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or
to render their acts void." (quoting Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879))); see also
Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REv. 363, 424-36 (2001) (discussing
the incongruity analysis).
189 100 U.S. at 397.
"' See supra Part II.A.1.
'9' 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
192 487 U.S. at 676.
193 Id. at 676 n.1 3.
194 Id. at 677.
' Id. at 676.
196 See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
'9' See United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
198 See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. at 674-79 (discussing the constitutionality of
interbranch appointments).
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Government."' 99 They expected sharing of functions" and even some confusion of
functions.2 ' There is therefore no inherent incongruity present in the judicial
appointment of filter teams that should "excuse the courts" from performing this
duty or "render [such appointments] void. 2 °2
POSTSCRIPT: HOW THE JEFFERSON SEARCH WOULD OCCUR UNDER THIS
NOTE'S PROPOSAL
First, Congress would pass a "Filter Team Authorization Act" similar to the
independent counsel statutes203 enumerating the duties and jurisdiction of the filter
teams, as well as their appointment and removal procedures. When the investigation
of Jefferson was initiated, or at such time as the Attorney General or lead prosecutor
realized that a search was necessary and that this search would encompass materials
privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause, the responsible official would apply
for the appointment of an independent filter team. At this point, Chief Judge Hogan
would appoint a three- to four-member filter team comprised of a combination of
private lawyers, non-DOJ government lawyers, political scientists, and legal scholars.
Next, the FBI and the DOJ would apply for a search warrant. The search warrant
would include a detailed list of specific items the government sought, as it did in the
real Jefferson raid. The Capitol Police would seal the office, and the search warrant
would then be executed (preferably not under the cover of night) in the presence of
Jefferson, his counsel, and designated house officials. Jefferson would be given an
opportunity to identify potentially privileged documents, at which time the independent
team would filter the documents and files to determine which were responsive and
which were privileged while they remained in Jefferson's office. The filter team
would do a document-by-document review to determine whether the legislative
privilege applied. Documents and files would be logged and that log would then be
provided to Hogan for review. Contested items would be made available to Hogan for
in camera inspection and final determination.
'99 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam).
200 See Marc R. Salans, Independent Counsel: The Separation of Powers and the
Separation of Politics from the Administration of Justice, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 910
(1987) ("The Federalist Papers indicate that the powers of each of the three branches of
government were not to be mutually exclusive .... They envisioned a system of shared
powers that would be flexible enough to withstand the test of time and would allow the nation
to govern itself effectively." (citations omitted)).
201 THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 196 ("Experience has
instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and
define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and
judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different branches.").
202 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676.
203 See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Speech or Debate Clause was crafted by the Framers to protect the legislature
from executive retaliation and to preserve Congress's position as a coequal, independent
branch.204 The Clause does not shield members of Congress from criminal prose-
cutions for bribery, but it does provide some necessary protections .2o5 These protections
act in conjunction with the separation of powers doctrine to protect Congress from
executive encroachments such as the shocking and unprecedented FBI raid of
Congressman William J. Jefferson's Capitol Hill office. The filter team used in the
Jefferson raid inadequately protected Jefferson's privilege and violated the separation
of powers and the Constitution.2 6
To more effectively protect Congress and its members from future encroachments,
this Note proposed the utilization of judge-created filter teams that are entirely
independent of the executive. Such filter teams would likely be classified as agents
or employees and could be appointed by a judge with no prior approval from
Congress. Alternatively, if the teams were classified as officers, they could still be
appointed by ajudge pursuant to an authorizing act of Congress because such teams
would undoubtedly consist of inferior, rather than principal, officers. 7 Because of
the judiciary's unique role as a neutral intervener between Congress and the President,
there would be no inherent incongruity in a judge appointing the independent filter
team, and the appointment would be constitutional.20 8 These proposed independent
filter teams would thus protect the Speech or Debate Clause privilege and the separation
of powers from future executive encroachments.
The DOJ' s argument that "[taking the Speech or Debate Clause to such an extreme
would impede legitimate law enforcement activities and give shelter to criminal
conduct' is not persuasive. Neither Jefferson, nor this Note, nor the D.C. Circuit has
suggested that the Speech or Debate Clause operates as a shield for illegality. Rather,
search procedures can be designed to better protect not only the legislative privilege,
but also the executive's interest in preserving the admissibility of evidence. Should
documents be seized during another FBI raid on Congress, the affected member would
undoubtedly challenge the admissibility of such evidence at trial, given the controversy
over the propriety of such procedures. In fact, Jefferson already obtained the return of
materials seized from his office when the D.C. Circuit held the raid unconstitutional.210
204 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
206 See supra Part II.B.
207 See supra Part III.A.
208 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
209 Corrected Brief for the United States, United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg.
No. 06-3105, 2007 WL 1022640, at *41 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
210 United States v. House Office Bldg. Room 2113 Wash., D.C. 20515, No. 06-3105,
2007 WL 2275237, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2007).
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The DOJ should welcome, rather than reject, new search procedures including
the use of independent, judicially-created filter teams, because such precautions give
criminal investigations into Congress increased legitimacy. Allowing members of
Congress to be present and to assert their privilege during searches would effectively
prevent the members from later challenging determinations made by the filter teams
and would likely decrease the amount of objectionable evidence at trial.
The context of criminal investigations into Congress is a unique one full of special
privileges and considerations; it is therefore imperative for both the charged member
of Congress and for the investigating executive that the judicial branch step between
them and guard the Constitution.
